The Modern Battlefield
In the modern battlefield, the United States has vast technological and substantial numerical superiority. That creates for many individual interpretations of the application of maneuver warfare. Most large governments don’t enjoy the idea of conflict with other nations, as such most modern warfare is considered “police actions” or “stabilization operations”. That is not to say maneuver warfare is useless, only that it is detrimental to assume that all enemies are of equal or greater strength.
The different styles of warfare stem from the use of the six previously stated aspects (intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics) to reduce the enemy’s ability to fight. Maneuver is still a significant aspect of modern combat, however it is over focused. The more unprepared an enemy is to fight on a dynamic level the more effect maneuver becomes.
The terrain of the modern battlefield is also a significant factor in the success of a military force. To emphasize the complexity of the environment, one can analyze the city of Fallujah, Iraq. The city’s layout is random. Zoning does not exist, residential, business, and industrial zones are one and the same. An infantry unit could move from a home to an office building or clothing store. The streets are narrow and walled, allowing for little cover should contact be made with enemy forces. Houses are densely packed within a few feet of each other, walls are made of brick and thick mortar. These factors made escape routes easier for insurgent forces.

References:
Marine Corps Gazette, November 05, 2005.
Army Field Manual 100-5
The Nature of War and the Realities of the Modern Battlefield, Major Andrew D. Walker, USMC.
Western Strategy
Currently the Marine Corps uses “maneuver warfare”. The reasoning behind this choice is based upon a series of assumptions. First is that combat has two components, fire and movement. The second assumption is that because of those aspects, combat has two distinct styles, which are attrition and maneuver. Attrition is based on firepower, described in the Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 as the, “destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower and technology. Maneuver is based on countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, “the object of shattering the enemy’s cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance.”
Due to the nature of the Marine Corps and the proliferation of modern weaponry, the Marine Corps cannot assume to have the numerical or technological advantage, therefore maneuver warfare is mandated.
The problem that arises (and has arisen) is that warfare is a much more complex concept. Maneuver warfare essentially simplifies all combat to the following formulas:
Friendly combat power = friendly firepower * friendly maneuverability
Enemy combat power = enemy firepower / friendly maneuverability
War, however, has many more variables, as common sense would dictate. There is a second ideology that includes and incorporates a few more variables: intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics. Interpretations of “warfighting” can be considerably more true based on the interrelationships between these concepts.

References:
Fleet Marine Force Manual 1
Sun Tzu. The Art of War.
The Nature of War and the Realities of the Modern Battlefield, Major Andrew D. Walker, USMC.
Fairly abstract side-note: Sun-Tzu was an early maneuverist, “in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.” Maneuver warfare focuses more on small tactical maneuvers to create devastating effects to the enemy. Sun-Tzu’s principles are strongly supported by modern maneuverists, however critics point out that modern warfare is not about absorbing sovereign nations.
Eastern Strategy
For obvious reasons first hand documents by modern enemy combatants is difficult to obtain, even if you email the pentagon and ask nicely. Obtainable information (for a civilian) is somewhat patchy. It is generally significant to note that tactics in a general sense haven’t changed much. The western military still adheres to strict codes of conduct regarding warfare, the middle eastern forces still use skirmishing tactics and psychological warfare.
Generally speaking there are two types of insurgents, guerrillas and martyrs. Guerrillas try to cause as much damage to marine forces as quickly as possible and then evade to fight another day. They will only engage on terrain of their choosing, after initial contact they will evade. They will generally try to evade in a manner which avoids other Marine contact. Martyrs try to cause as much damage as possible before they themselves are killed, their objective is death. They will fortify a position and wait for the opportunity to cause as much damage as possible. The major difference between the two, other than the obvious, is that guerrillas will evade and therefore do not generally fortify a location in the manner martyrs would.
An excerpt from a report on insurgent tactics: “Overall, the enemy has adapted their tactics and techniques in order to maximize their strong-points and hit Marines when they are the most vulnerable.” The difficulty in fighting their tactics is that they do not adhere to conventional warfare, while the United States has to in order to maintain a moderately respected image. The insurgent forces do not care about our ethics, views, and restrictions, they care about survival.

References:
Marine Corps Gazette, November 05, 2005.